




So far as public international law is concerned we must still agree with
Hobbes when he finds a state of war in which there is no security because
there is no sovereign power over all, and when he concludes that foreign
policy must be dictated by the need for self-preservation so long as that
danger exists.
In many respects we have not passed the stage of custom, and that of
custom which is frequently disregarded in times of stress, as in Iran where
the holding of fifty-two American diplomats as hostages has been rightly
described by President-Elect Reagan as the act of "criminals and kidnap-
pers."
An English Judge, Lord Parker, said that after the First World War that
"The League of Nations attempted to use the law to dam the course of
history. The inevitable result was to discredit the law."
The authors of the United Nations Charter were more realistic when they
made provision for the use of the veto by those nations whose acceptance of
resolutions was thought vital to their enforcement.
If in the years that have passed since 50 Allied Nations signed the Char-
ter in San Francisco in the summer of 1945 there have been many disap-
pointments, there have also been some successes. The peace-keeping forces
of the United Nations and its special agencies have established a new basis
for international cooperation. Nor can the effect of world opinion in con-
demning such acts as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the holding of
the hostages by Iran be underestimated.
Progress has been slow and tentative but there are events taking place in
many spheres which show a growing awareness of the need to pool sover-
eignty in particular areas for particular purposes in the general interest.
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European Court of Justice
I would like today to refer particularly to what has been happening in the
European Community in the context of the development of the influence of
the European Court of Justice.
The European Community is not a federal state in the classical sense; nor
is it likely to become one, at least in the foreseeable future. Neither is it a
Confederation although its position has been described as being in some
ways similar to that of the Confederation of the Thirteen States in the dec-
ade before 1789.
What is significant is that under the Treaty of Rome the members of the
Community have accepted a mutual obligation to bring about the approxi-
mation of such national laws as directly affect the establishment and func-
tions of the Common Market. The purposes of the Treaty are confined to
the economic sphere, with only such excursions into other spheres, such as
social affairs, as are ancillary to the operation of the Common Market.
Nevertheless, while the scope for Community law is confined to the eco-
nomic and financial fields, the legislative powers of the Community within
those areas covered by the Treaties are very wide.
The most important obligations imposed on a Member State are first, to
take no measures which might impede the free movement of goods, persons
and services throughout the Common Market, and second to abolish any
discrimination between imported and domestic goods and between national
workers and workers from another Member State of the Community.
It has been accepted that a body of Community law is needed to establish
the basic conditions of free and fair competition within the Market.
The European Court in Luxembourg is the final arbiter on what the
Treaty and the Community legislation means.
This has prompted Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, to say the Treaty
of Rome "is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back. Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is
hereinafter part of our law." As a result we must speak and think of Com-
munity law, of Community rights and obligations, and we must give effect
to them.
The main limitation is the lack of enforcement powers. Ultimate sover-
eignty remains with the national states in the sense that if they choose to be
in breach of the Treaty there is no sovereign power to enforce compliance.
In this sense the pooling of sovereignty in the general interest may still be
described as voluntary.
The fact remains that in practice the European Court has steadily built
up a formidable body of case law and precedent in dealing with over 200
cases a year. And Member States have so far accepted the decisions of the
European Court even when they have been most unpalatable. Thus when
the Court said in 1977 that British pig subsidies were illegal, the then Agri-
cultural Minister, Mr. John Silkin, although he is one of the opponents of
the EEC, immediately complied.
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The European Court has not yet met its President Andrew Jackson who
issued the challenge: "You have given your judgment, now you enforce it."
When it does we must hope that it will survive the challenge as successfully
as did the U.S. Supreme Court.
We are now indeed seeing the emergence of a new European system of
law. The Court is steadily creating a European Bill of Rights by upholding
individuals against the Member States.
It has refused, for example, to allow Britain to deport a Frenchman solely
on the ground that he possessed cannabis. It has established that the citi-
zens of Member States now have the right to collect social security and
pensions in other Member States than their own.
In many ways the European Court of Justice is proving the strongest
force for unity in the Community. It is a Court whose potential litigants
number over 300 million people-a Court called upon to apply a unique
body of law, a totally new legal order, even if the techniques used have
respectable historical antecedents.
Formidable obstacles lie in the way of solving all the problems of a mul-
tilingual community consisting of countries each with a long tradition of
statehood and separate legal development. But while President Giscard
d'Estaing of France has urged fellow heads of state and government to "do
something about the European Court and its illegal decisions," the Court
has already defined the most important principle of Community law: its
primacy, in the fields covered by the Treaties, over national laws and its
direct and immediate applicability in each Member State.
Thus I find myself in agreement with Mr. Vincent McKurick, Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine who wrote recently that even
taking account of those less than rosy things in the garden, "the past accom-
plishment and the future potential of the European Court will draw
applause and encouragement from all who see political union as the best
hope for a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe."
Pooling of Sovereignty
The European Community is the most striking but, of course, not the
only example of an emerging acceptance of international rights and obliga-
tions that involve some surrender or pooling of national sovereignty. Every
international Treaty or Convention involves this principle to a greater or
lesser extent. It applies to the North Atlantic Treaty, to Western European
Union, and to the activities of the International Energy Agency. It is also
reflected in the development of such Institutions as the Council of Europe,
the Nordic Council, and Benelux.
European Convention on Human Rights
The Council of Europe, whose significance lies in the fact that it repre-
sents a wider Europe than the European Community, has made a more
notable contribution than is generally recognized. It has been responsible
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for the European Convention on Human Rights which actually implements
the all-too-theoretical Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the
United Nations. Since France and Switzerland finally ratified the Conven-
tion in 1974 it has given democratic Europe a simple legal basis in matters
of human rights.
As a result of the Convention, British citizens have the right to appeal to
the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg if their recourse to British courts
proves unsuccessful. Belgium has amended its vagrancy legislation, and
West Germany its law on detention pending trial.
International Arbitration
In the sphere of private international law we have seen equally striking
developments in recent years, notably in regard to the growth of interna-
tional arbitration.
Leaving entirely on one side the argument about whether recourse to
arbitration rather than to the courts is cheaper or quicker-which may
sometimes be regarded as highly debatable-it is the increasing complexi-
ties of international trade and commerce which have changed the situation
dramatically.
Businesses of every nationality are now increasingly reluctant to choose
the law of one nation rather than another. It is not simply a question of
which law is to prevail. There is the even more compelling argument that it
is very dangerous for a party to permit a contract of any complexity to be
governed by a law of which he or his advisers have only a superficial
knowledge.
An equally compelling reason for using arbitration clauses in transna-
tional commercial contracts is that a foreign arbitration award is now
enforceable in national jurisdictions in far greater measure than a foreign
court judgment. This has been reinforced as more and more countries have
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitration Awards, adopted in New York in 1958.
Although seventy-five countries have now ratified the Convention including
the United States (in 1970) and the United Kingdom (in 1975).
Arbitration therefore constitutes in many cases a more effective-and
often the sole effective-method for solving disputes.
Both English and United States courts have been traditionally opposed to
irrevocable arbitration agreements which ousted the jurisdiction of the
courts on matters of law. Our common law required arbitration clauses
based on the "fixed and recognizable system of law" which our courts
demanded. But this doctrine has been steadily eroded.
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925, reversing centuries of judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements was designed to allow parties to avoid
"the costliness and delays of litigation" and to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts."
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The effectiveness of this Act was, however, undermined by the decision in
Wiko v. Swan (346 U.S. 427) when the Supreme Court declined to apply
the 1925 Act's provisions because of conflict with the provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933, which was designed to protect investors, and so
declared unenforceable the arbitration agreement in that case.
In 1974, in the case of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court,
albeit only by 5 to 4, in what was described as a dramatic decision ruled
that to allow repudiation of an arbitration clause would reflect "a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
Courts."
In that case the contract contained a clause providing that "any contro-
versy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof"
would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris, France, and that "the laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A.,
shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and perform-
ance."
Mr. Justice Stewart delivering the majority opinion, said that uncertainty
will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching two or
more countries each with its own substantive laws and conflict of law rules.
He concluded: "A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in
which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an
almost indisputable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and pre-
dictability essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore,
such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement
might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties
or unfamiliar with the problem areas involved."
The dissenting minority opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas
presented the argument that foreign corporations could nullify United
States law by arbitration clauses which send defrauded Americans to the
"uncertainties of arbitration on foreign soil, or if those investors cannot
afford to arbitrate these clauses in a far-off forum to no remedy or at all."
Mr. Justice Douglas added: "Moreover the international aura which the
Court gives this case is ominous. We now have many multinational Corpo-
rations in vast operations around the world, Europe, South America, the
Middle East and Asia. Up to this day, it has been assumed by virtue of
Wilko that they were all protected by our various federal securities Acts."
Ominous or not, the Scherk case was a significant victory for interna-
tional arbitration and was certainly to some extent influenced by the United
States adoption and ratification of the New York Convention.
In Britain we have had to change our old attitudes in a very similar fash-
ion. For a long time London was ruled out by many as a venue for arbitra-
tion while parties could not contract out of appeals to the Commercial
Court on a case stated. The Arbitration Act, 1979, has now made it possible
to hold in London the sort of arbitration supervised by the International
Chamber of Commerce. Under the new system there can be no appeal
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from an arbitrator's decision to the High Court (of which the Commercial
Court is part) unless the High Court agrees. There can, therefore, be no
more academic or frivolous appeals of the kind previously pursued by those
wishing to delay payment or settlement.
The new Act also provides, for the first time, for parties to disavow their
rights of appeal at the contract stage.
So we can hope to see more of you professionally engaged in London in
the years ahead-all inspired I trust by the principle that "justice delayed is
justice denied."
